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*E.H.R.L.R. 280  Abstract   
Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights sets out 
State parties' key obligations with regard to the implementation of the rights in the 
Covenant. According to that provision, States are under a duty to take steps to the 
maximum of their available resources, to achieve the full realisation of Covenant rights 
progressively. In addition to programmatic duties, art.2(1) has also been recognised as 
imposing a number of immediate substantive and procedural obligations. Numerous 
aspects of art.2(1) have been the subject of extensive discussion amongst academics, legal 
professionals and others. However, so far, only limited consideration has been given to the 
budget-specific obligations that are imposed by art.2(1). Linking budget decisions 
regarding resource allocation and expenditure with the range of immediate and 
programmatic duties imposed by ICESCR, this article analyses art.2(1) from a “ budget 
perspective” .   
Introduction   
Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) sets out the key international legal obligations of States Parties with regard to 
the implementation of the rights in the Covenant.1 The employment of the phrases “ 
maximum available resources”  and “ progressive achievement”  constitutes a recognition 
by the drafters that the full realisation of all economic, social and cultural rights will 
generally not be able to be achieved immediately.2 Article 2(1) is therefore frequently 
presented as:  
“ a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the difficulties 
involved for any country in ensuring full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.” 
3   
*E.H.R.L.R. 281  The obligations set out in art.2(1) have been the subject of extensive 
academic and judicial discussion.4 Debate has centred on the scope of those duties, 
addressing issues such as the appropriate balance to be struck between the immediate and 
progressive obligations under art.2(1). In particular, much recent work has focused on the 
question of how to evaluate whether or not states are giving effect to art.2(1) adequately, 
with an ever-greater focus on the development of methodologies to monitor the 
implementation of this and other economic and social rights (ESR) obligations.5 Research 
has also been done linking budget decisions with obligations imposed by specific ESR.6 So 
far, however, there has been only very limited academic consideration of the 
budget-specific obligations that are imposed by art.2(1).7   
Given the pivotal role that the state budget plays in terms of national resource-related 
decision-making and activities, it is crucial that the implications that art.2(1) has for 
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budgetary decisions, processes and outputs should be fully assessed and analysed. The UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights has observed:  
“ the budget -- as the instrument that determines the extent of the State's resources, their 
allocation and prospective expenditures -- is particularly relevant for the realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights.” 8   
Indeed, there can be no doubt that the budget is one of the most important of the “ 
legislative measures”  that states are enjoined to take in order to ensure the full realisation 
of Covenant rights in terms of art.2(1).9   
At the domestic level, the linkage between budgetary decisions and the realisation of ESR 
is recognised in a number of constitutions that afford strong protection to such rights, with 
states being constitutionally obliged to direct resources towards ESR-related services. This 
is particularly evident in Latin America. For example, the resource dimensions of ESR 
obligations are made explicit in the Transitional Provisions of the 2008 Constitution of 
Ecuador, which entrenches the duty to progressively allocate resources towards the 
national health system. According to that instrument, the general health budget destined 
for the financing of the health system will be increased annually by a percentage not less 
than 0.5 per cent of the GDP.10 Similarly, in relation to education, the Constitution obliges 
the state to assign public resources from the *E.H.R.L.R. 282  General Budget in a 
progressive manner for the initial basic and secondary education,11 stipulating an annual 
increase of at least 0.5 per cent of the GDP until a minimum of 6 per cent is reached.12 
Article 212 of the Brazilian Constitution requires that:  
“ the Union shall apply, annually, never less than eighteen percent, and the states, the 
Federal District, and the municipalities, at least twenty-five percent of the tax revenues, 
including those resulting from transfers, in the maintenance and development of 
education.”   
Funding for ESR is also entrenched in the Constitution of the Philippines, which requires the 
State to assign the “ highest budgetary priority”  to education.13   
This article builds on, and contributes to, the work already done on the relationship 
between budgets and the realisation of human rights by civil society organisations and 
alliances such as the International Budget Partnership, IHRIP, Fundar and IDASA.14 In it, 
the authors link budget decisions regarding resource allocation and expenditure with the 
range of immediate and programmatic of duties imposed by the ICESCR, analysing art.2(1) 
from a “ budget perspective” .  
Article 2(1): a brief, general overview   
One of the key objectives of ICESCR is to establish clear obligations for States in respect of 
the full realisation of the rights contained in that instrument.15 Progressive realisation is 
essentially a means to an end. The ultimate goal of ICESCR (including art.2(1)) is the full 
realisation of all the rights set out in the Covenant. Essentially, art.2(1) requires state 
parties to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realisation of 
rights.16 It is understood that the progress of realisation of rights will not be universal but 
will be relative to the resources available.17 Implicit in the duty to progressively realise ESR 
is a prohibition on taking deliberately retrogressive measures,18 which Sepulveda has 
defined as backwards steps in the level of ESR enjoyment as a consequence of an 
intentional decision(s) by the state.19   
The second element to address in terms of art.2(1) is the state's duty to use the maximum 
of its available resources. This obligation requires states to use all the resources which can 
be expended for a particular purpose without sacrificing other, essential services.20 Like 
progressive realisation, this duty entails a prioritisation of resources21 : in times of resource 
constraints, the most vulnerable and disadvantaged members of society have to be 
prioritised,22 albeit that who is “ vulnerable”  and/or “ disadvantaged”  may vary depending 
on the particular domestic context.  
*E.H.R.L.R. 283  In further articulating the obligations stemming from art.2(1), the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter called “ the Committee” ) 
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has adopted the so-called tripartite typology of respect, protect and fulfil.23 The analytical 
framework is useful in illustrating that all human rights give rise to a range of negative as 
well as positive obligations.24 The obligation to respect refers to a prohibition on state 
interference with existing access or enjoyment of an ESR, with the state being under a 
corresponding duty to ensure that existing access is not disrupted.25 While, in most cases, 
this will require the state to refrain from taking certain actions, the duty to respect may 
also impose positive obligations to ensure that existing access is maintained.26 The duty to 
protect requires States to deter, stop or impose sanctions on third parties when they are 
unduly interfering with the enjoyment of a right or threatening to do so.27 At the tertiary 
level, the duty to fulfil requires the state to facilitate, provide28 or promote29 the enjoyment 
of rights when people cannot secure the enjoyment of those rights of their own accord. In 
facilitating access, the state must pro-actively engage in activities intended to strengthen 
people's access to and utilisation of resources and means to ensure their livelihood.30 The 
duty to promote requires States to take a variety of actions necessary to create, maintain 
and restore access to ESR.31 Finally, States are required to provide access directly if 
individuals cannot realise the rights themselves on grounds reasonably considered to be 
beyond their control.32   
As mentioned above, in addition to the progressive obligations imposed by art.2(1), there 
are various immediate duties rooted in that provision, which have to be given effect to in 
budget decision-making. Substantively, states have to ensure immediately that everyone 
has access to the “ minimum essential level of each of the rights” 33 and that all rights are 
enjoyed and exercised without discrimination.34 Procedurally speaking States have to 
immediately adopt a plan which contains time bound goals and is subject to continuous 
monitoring.35 States also have to provide mechanisms which ensure the participation of 
relevant stakeholders, access to information and transparency.36 They must establish 
accountability mechanisms, respect due process in decision-making, and provide remedies 
in case of violations. Failure to duly include mechanisms to satisfy these procedural 
requirements may amount to violations of art.2(1).37   
Budget dimensions of ICESCR obligations   
Budgets are generally viewed as being primarily focussed upon the employment of state 
resources, particularly those of a financial nature. The reference to “ resources”  in art.2(1) 
refers to a broad understanding of resources, of which financial resources are admittedly 
only one aspect.38 The obligation *E.H.R.L.R. 284  to use the “ maximum of available 
resources”  refers to the real resources (for example, human, organisational and scientific 
resources) available within the country in question and extends beyond those over which 
the state has direct control, to include sources such as development aid.39 Consequently, 
existing governmental allocations are not automatically authoritative in determining what 
the maximum available resources for economic and social right realisation are.40 This 
article, however, focuses very specifically on resources that are allocated through the 
budget--even though art.2(1) merits a much broader “ resource”  analysis, including issues 
such as revenue and external debt.41   
The duty to progressively realise rights requires States Parties to continuously move 
towards full realisation of the rights in ICESCR. Crucially, available resources have to be 
optimally prioritised to give effect to ICESCR rights.42 If the realisation of ESR is 
diminishing or is remaining stagnant, States have to progressively increase budget 
allocations to ensure progressive realisation and adherence to ICESCR obligations, 
specifically art.2(1).43 Fredman has stated that this prioritisation is guided by what have 
been labelled “ competing principles”  which should be weighted according to the range of 
ICESCR obligations based on effectiveness, participation, and accountability.44 These are 
naturally dependent on the country-specific context, the degree to which full realisation of 
the various rights is lacking and in relation to whom.  
The budget must, therefore, balance the various competing demands according to 
context-specific needs, prioritised in accordance with the full range of ICESCR obligations. 
Indeed, as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights highlights:  
“ the budget is a useful source of information to evaluate which normative commitments 
are taken seriously by the State, because it provides a demonstration of the State's 
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preferences, priorities and trade-offs in spending.45 ”   
Apart from entailing an increase in the resources allocated towards the implementation of 
ESR, the duty to realise ESR progressively also refers to an increasingly effective use of the 
resources available.46 Budgetary allocations must therefore be designed to ensure 
improvement in the implementation of rights, as well as expanding access to the rights. In 
other words, states have to ensure that the available resources are used to benefit a 
progressively increasing number of people as well as a progressively increasing range of 
people.47 This has been explicitly noted by the Constitutional Court in South Africa in the 
famous Grootboom case.48 Here, the Court stated that the requirement of progressive 
realisation means that:  
*E.H.R.L.R. 285  “ accessibility should be progressively facilitated: legal, administrative, 
operational and financial hurdles should be examined and, where possible, lowered over 
time.” 49   
As stated above, implicit in the duty to progressively achieve full realisation of ESR is a 
prohibition on retrogressive measures. In budgetary terms, this includes unjustified 
reductions in public expenditure devoted to the implementation to ESR in the absence of 
adequate compensatory measures for the protection of injured individuals.50 Various 
examples of retrogressive measures have been identified by the Committee in its 
consideration of state reports submitted under ICESCR. These range from the steady 
decline in expenditure on the health care system in Algeria,51 to budgetary cutbacks in the 
educational sector in Senegal,52 to the successive restrictions on social security benefits 
introduced by Canada.53   
Moving from the international (law) to the domestic context, one instance in which 
budget-related retrogressive budgetary measure was found to be justified in light of a fiscal 
crisis was the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v 
NAPE. 54 Here, a challenge was brought against legislation that cancelled a pay equity 
agreement, which--amongst other things--would have raised the salaries of a 
female-dominated work classifications to a comparable level to those of male-dominated 
classifications for work of equal value. The legislation clearly amounted to a retrogressive 
measure in terms of the right to fair pay (an element of the right to just and favourable 
conditions of work) of the female employees in question. The Court found the legislation to 
be in violation of the right to equality set out in s.15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. However, it ruled that the infringement constituted a reasonable limitation 
in terms of s.1 of the Charter. In doing so, the Court highlighted that--while the Canadian 
courts would continue to look with strong scepticism at attempts to justify infringements of 
Charter rights on the basis of budgetary constraints--they could not close their eyes to the 
periodic occurrence of financial emergencies when measures must be taken to juggle 
priorities to see a government through the crisis. The Court found that the provincial 
government's response to the fiscal crisis was proportional to its objective as: (1) because 
the pay equity payout represented a significant portion of the budget, its postponement 
was rationally connected to averting a serious financial crisis; (2) the government's 
response was tailored to minimally impair rights in the context of the problem it 
confronted; and (3) on a balance of probabilities, the detrimental impact of a delay in 
achieving pay equity did not outweigh the importance of preserving the fiscal health of a 
provincial government through a temporary but serious financial crisis.55   
This decision would seem to provide support to the notion that a fiscal crisis essentially 
negates state's budget-related obligations with regard to progressive realisation and 
non-discrimination. This is not the case, however. Notably, the Canadian Charter does not 
explicitly include ESR, nor did the Supreme Court *E.H.R.L.R. 286  in this case refer to 
sources providing detail on the circumstances in which retrogressive measures are 
justifiable in terms of international human rights law. Therefore, it certainly cannot be 
assumed that the Committee would have come to a similar conclusion if faced with a 
retrogressive budgetary measure taken by a state in similar circumstances.56   
The obligation to use the maximum resources available is inextricably linked to the 
obligation to advance the realisation of ESR progressively. This obligation has been 
analysed by a number of civil society and research organisations carrying out ESR-based 
budget work in terms of the effectiveness57 and sufficiency58 of spending.59 Diversion of 
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budget allocations intended for ESR can constitute a violation of ICESCR if it results in 
non-enjoyment or reduction of enjoyment of rights.60 To this end, allocations and 
expenditure in relation to ESR budget line items vis-à-vis non-ESR-related line items 
provide an indication of compliance. Similarly, the duty to use the maximum of available 
resources means that budget allocations must be fully expended for their intended ESR 
purpose.61   
Budgetary decisions and processes can also be assessed using the tripartite typology. The 
duty to respect requires states to ensure existing access to ESR is maintained. If budgetary 
cutbacks result in the interference with or diminution of current enjoyment of ESR, the duty 
to respect has been breached. In addition, budgetary obligations may be required for both 
the establishment and/or the maintenance of the institutional framework required to 
ensure existing enjoyment is preserved.62 In fluctuating economic climates, maintaining 
existing access can require additional budget allocations. For instance, in the case of 
natural disaster or armed conflict, a state might be required to make additional, ad hoc, 
resource allocations, on top of the original budgetary allocations for ESR, to maintain 
existing access.63   
It is also frequently necessary in terms of the obligation to respect for allocations to 
increase--rather than simply remain the same. This is particularly the case in the context of 
states experiencing inflation.64 In one celebrated instance, the Argentinean Supreme Court 
ordered the readjustment of pension levels in accordance with official wage index 
variations which were linked to inflation levels. Effectively, additional resources had to be 
allocated to ensure that existing enjoyment of pension levels remained the same in the 
context of inflation.65 The duty to allocate budgetary resources in order to maintain (or 
respect) existing levels of access to social security grants also came under discussion in the 
South African Ncamile litigation.66 Applicants in this case approached the High Court with 
regard to the fact that the income threshold for the child support grant had not risen with 
inflation, unlike that for other social grants. The means test was built into the application 
procedure for the grant, yet the income threshold had remained the same since 
*E.H.R.L.R. 287  1998. This meant that, in the context of inflation, newly-applying 
caregivers would have to become progressively poorer in order to access the grant as time 
passed. The case was ultimately withdrawn when the Department of Social Development 
agreed to amend the existing regulations to replace the static income threshold with a new 
means test consistent with inflation levels.  
The duty to protect requires states to allocate sufficient funding to regulatory mechanisms 
that protect against the interference by third parties with the enjoyment of ESR.67 This 
would include budgetary provision for bodies such as labour courts dealing with complaints 
against non-state employers or housing tribunals empowered to address, amongst other 
things, allegations of discrimination perpetrated by private landlords. In the context of 
social security, the Committee has stated that:  
“ where social security schemes, whether contributory or non-contributory, are operated or 
controlled by third parties, States parties retain the responsibility of administering the 
national social security system and ensuring that private actors do not compromise equal, 
adequate, affordable, and accessible social security.” 68   
In order to prevent such abuses, an effective regulatory system must be established which 
includes framework legislation, independent monitoring, genuine public participation and 
imposition of penalties for non-compliance.69 Such a regulatory system will inevitably need 
to be budgeted for.  
The duty to fulfil tends to be the most resource-dependent of the duties, placing an 
obligation on states to do whatever it takes to overcome the obstacles for the full 
enjoyment of rights.70 Budgetary allocations and expenditure will play a key role in state 
efforts to give effect to this obligation, whether with regard to the facilitation, promotion or 
provision of such rights.  
Budgetary allocations facilitating rights include funding any initiative that lays the 
foundation needed for full realisation. This includes funding for an assessment of the 
current situation in the country as a whole, as well as a periodic repetition of that exercise 
at brief intervals.71 Budget allocations directed towards promoting ESR can similarly take 
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on a variety of forms but include the commitment of financial resources to provide 
necessary information and awareness-raising.72 Sufficient resources also have to be 
allocated to train public servants around human rights, and specifically the rights of those 
that are most vulnerable.73 Broadly speaking, the state also has to fund institutions and 
initiatives that are necessary for promoting acceptance and understanding of rights and 
relevant enforcement procedures.74 The final aspect of the duty to fulfil requires states to 
provide the rights directly where right-holders cannot do so for themselves. Depending on 
the level of development of the country in question, the duty of the state as provider can 
vary from the establishment of a minimum safety net to a full comprehensive welfare 
model as is found in Nordic countries.75 As stated above, certain groups of people are 
entitled to special measures of protection and hence a calculated prioritisation in states 
efforts to provide for their rights--this prioritisation naturally has to be reflected in budget 
decisions. This applies in particular to people that cannot by their own efforts ensure 
satisfaction of their basic needs, including children, people living with disabilities, persons 
in state custody or care and displaced persons.  
The second and tertiary levels of the tripartite typology of ESR obligations are particularly 
relevant in the context of privatisation, with states having to ensure that the discharge of 
the full range of ESR obligations are not hampered by governmental delegation of powers 
to non-state actors or the privatisation *E.H.R.L.R. 288  of services.76 In addition, where 
ESR-related services have been delegated or contracted out to third parties, the obligation 
to fulfil may also come into play. Regardless of whether an ESR-related service is provided 
by the state or by a private actor, the state ultimately remains responsible for ensuring the 
realisation of ESR. This includes an underlying duty to fulfil the full enjoyment of rights. 
Therefore, where the system selected by the State (public, private or, indeed, any mixture 
thereof) does not ensure such enjoyment of rights, the State has, amongst other things, a 
final duty to provide for the rights directly.  
The distinction between the immediate and progressive duties imposed by art.2(1) has 
already been mentioned. When a significant number of people are lacking basic necessities 
or essentials, states are prima facia failing to discharge their minimum core obligations.77 
This has been interpreted to imply an obligation to intrude without limits into public and 
private resources previously used for other purposes to satisfy “ core”  obligations, based 
on the rebuttable presumption that all states have the resources necessary to give effect to 
minimum core obligations if they define resources broadly enough and are sufficiently 
aggressive in resource acquisition.78 Failure to give effect to the minimum core places an 
increased justificatory burden on states to demonstrate that “ every effort”  has been made 
to satisfy minimum obligations as a matter of priority.79 In the present context, such a 
justification could involve a transparent and accountable scrutiny of resource allocations in 
budgets. A minimum core type obligation was a recent subject of discussion of the German 
Constitutional Court in the so-called “ Hartz IV case” .80 Here, the court was called upon to 
scrutinise the process by which the legislature set the level of unemployment and welfare 
assistance. The German Basic Law guarantees an “ Existenzminimum”  which loosely refers 
to a minimum benefit that provides the means to live with basic human dignity.81 In this 
sense, the “ Existenzminimum”  is similar to the minimum core as elaborated by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In the Hartz IV case, the court found 
that the manner in which the country's welfare law was calculated did not meet 
constitutional muster. Importantly, the court found that the method used to evaluate the 
income and consumption levels of low-income households was not legitimate. In other 
words, the process of determining what is required for a basic, dignified existence was 
found not to be based on sound empirical data. Amongst other things, certain expenditure 
line items were reduced without a legitimate, statistical evaluation: for example, the 
benefits for electricity payments were reduced by 15 per cent of their original level. The 
court also highlighted, in relation to children, that the law makers had avoided any 
substantive evaluation of child specific rights or needs. The law makers were ordered to 
recalculate the level of benefits using sound statistical evidence of what is needed for a 
basic, dignified existence. This case is an example of judicial scrutiny of a minimum 
core-type duty and a principled decision-making process, demonstrating that calculations 
of what is needed for a dignified survival, have to be based on sound statistical data, 
through a process which is transparent, open and accountable.  
The duty not to discriminate in art.2(2) is also of immediate application,82 and applies to all 
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art.2(1) obligations in the sense that the discharge of immediate as well as progressive 
obligations must not cause or perpetuate discrimination against groups of people.83 It also 
applies across the tripartite typology. In terms of budget allocations, the obligation to 
ensure non-discrimination can require the funding of preventative measures and 
affirmative action initiatives, as well as financial compensation for past discriminations.84   
*E.H.R.L.R. 289  The duty to take account of the most vulnerable groups in society plays 
a key role with regard to the immediate procedural obligations identified by the Committee 
as necessary to ensure adherence to a principled policy making process, including those 
related to the development of policy85 and implementation plans86 and the monitoring the 
realisation of ESR.87 National strategies have to identify the resources that are available 
and the most cost-effective way of using them.88 This will necessarily involve a 
consideration of current and future budget allocations. Other procedural requirements such 
as the right to participation89 can amount to a violation of international law if not adhered 
to.90 Thus, if budget decision-making processes are to be in compliance with ICESCR, they 
must be transparent and participatory, with provision made for decision-makers to be held 
accountable to right-holders.91 Furthermore, participation and accountability efforts also 
have to be actively and inclusively budgeted for, bearing in mind again the needs of the 
most vulnerable and potentially excluded persons.  
Conclusion   
The importance of the principle of the progressive realisation of ESR and the obligation to 
use the maximum resources available set out in art.2(1) are reflected in the widespread 
inclusion of these principles (and variants thereof) in a range of international, regional and 
domestic human rights instruments.92   
In addition to the increasing legal protection being afforded to the principles set out in 
art.2(1),93 as the introduction to this article highlighted, there is a growing recognition of 
the importance of budgetary decisions in terms of achieving the realisation of ESR. These 
factors combine to produce a strong inducement--and perhaps a compulsion--to evaluate 
budgets from an ESR perspective and from that of art.2(1) in particular. Indeed, there is a 
growing body of examples of innovative efforts to employ ESR-based budget work in 
efforts to advance ESR in a range of contexts, including general advocacy94 and litigation.95   
Much work remains to be done in terms of developing frameworks and methodologies to 
evaluate state compliance with its obligations under ICESCR--whether budget-related or 
otherwise. This article, however, constitutes a step towards the advancement of general 
understanding of the budget-related obligations stemming from art.2(1) ICESCR and the 
way in which states can and should give effect to such.  
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